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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9, Defendant Google LLC 
moves for leave to file this motion for partial reconsideration of the Court’s order on Google’s 
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ class action complaint. See Dkt. No. 142 (“Order”); see also Dkt. No. 
57 (“Motion to Dismiss”); Dkt. No. 81 (“MTD Reply”). 
A party seeking reconsideration must show either a material change in the facts or the law, 
or a “manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which 
were presented to the Court.”  N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Google’s proposed motion for partial 
reconsideration respectfully submits that the Court failed to consider dispositive legal arguments in 
Google’s Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, Google submits that the Court did not address Google’s 
argument that the “personal information” that Google allegedly misappropriated from Plaintiffs is 
not “property” under California law because it is not capable of “exclusive possession and control” 
by Plaintiffs and otherwise fails to meet the requirements for intangible property set forth in Kremen 
v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition, although the Court cited In re Facebook 
Privacy Litigation, 572 F. App’x 494, 494 (9th Cir. 2014) in support of its decision that the alleged 
personal information constitutes Plaintiffs’ property for purposes of California’s larceny statute and 
the Unfair Competition Law’s (“UCL”) “lost money or property” standing requirement (Order at 
36, 38), the Ninth Circuit actually reached the opposite conclusion in that case, affirming dismissal 
of a UCL claim because Facebook’s alleged “dissemination of [plaintiffs’] personal information and 
[the] los[t] sales value of that information” “failed” to satisfy the UCL’s “lost money or property” 
standing requirement. See id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Google respectfully submits that the 
Court’s Order is inconsistent with these Ninth Circuit decisions. 
Google respectfully submits that the Court also failed to address Google’s argument that 
Plaintiffs’ theft by false pretenses theory of larceny fails to satisfy the elements of the claim—a 
point Plaintiffs effectively conceded in their opposition by not responding to it. 
This motion is brought with reasonable diligence because the Court entered the Order on 
March 17, 2021. Accordingly, Google respectfully asks the Court to grant leave to file this Motion 
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for partial reconsideration, order a briefing schedule for an opposition and reply, and set a hearing 
date. 
This Motion is based on this motion for leave to file a motion for partial reconsideration, its 
memorandum of points and authorities, and the pleadings, orders, and other records on file. 





 By /s/ Andrew H. Schapiro 
 
 
Andrew H. Schapiro (admitted pro hac vice) 
 
Attorney for Defendant Google LLC 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Google respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to file this motion for partial 
reconsideration of the Court’s order denying Google’s Motion to Dismiss. See Dkt. No. 142 (the 
“Order”); see also Dkt. No. 57 (Motion to Dismiss). Google appreciates that reconsideration 
motions are disfavored and that parties may not re-argue what the Court has already decided. 
Instead, a movant must show a “manifest failure” to consider a dispositive legal argument that was 
previously raised. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Google respectfully submits that the Court did not consider a 
dispositive argument that Google raised in its motion to dismiss papers—namely, that the personal 
information Google allegedly stole from Plaintiffs is not capable of “exclusive possession or 
control” by Plaintiffs, see Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003), and therefore 
cannot constitute Plaintiffs’ “personal property” under California law. The Court cited In re 
Facebook Privacy Litigation, 572 F. App’x 494, 494 (9th Cir. 2014), in support of its decision that 
the alleged personal information constitutes Plaintiffs’ property for purposes of the larceny statute 
and the UCL’s “lost money or property” standing requirement. Order at 36, 38. However, the Ninth 
Circuit actually reached the opposite conclusion in that case, affirming dismissal of a UCL claim 
because Facebook’s alleged “dissemination of [plaintiffs’] personal information and [the] los[t] 
sales value of that information” “failed” to satisfy the UCL’s “lost money or property” standing 
requirement.1 See id. (emphasis added). Google respectfully submits that these Ninth Circuit 
decisions require dismissal of Plaintiffs’ larceny and UCL claims. 
In addition, the Court did not decide Google’s argument that Plaintiffs have failed to 
plausibly allege theft by false pretense, which requires a “consensual transfer of possession as well 
                                                 
1   In addition, on the same day that this Court issued its Order, another court in this District 
dismissed a UCL claim based on the defendant’s alleged collection and sale of personal information 
(geolocation data) for advertising. See, e.g., Hart v. TWC Product and Technology, LLC, Case No. 
4:20-cv-03842-JST, Dkt. No. 45 at 10 (N.D. Cal. March 17, 2021) (Tigar, J.) (“[Plaintiff] contends 
that he has lost property because ‘TWC has taken, maintained, transmitted, and devalued his 
valuable geolocation data.’  However, [plaintiff] ‘has not shown how this information has economic 
value to him. That the information has external value, but no economic value to plaintiff, cannot 
establish that plaintiff has personally lost money or property.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bass 
v. Facebook, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). 
































 -4- Case No. 5:20-cv-05146-LHK 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 
 
as title of property.”  People v. Williams, 57 Cal. 4th 776, 788 (2013) (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs 
expressly allege that Google “stole, took and/or fraudulently appropriated Plaintiffs’ PI without 
Plaintiffs’ consent,” and make no allegations whatsoever as to title. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 400 (Compl.). 
Although Google raised this point in its Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs did not respond to it in their 
Opposition, as Google pointed out in its Reply. Yet the Court did not address this argument. 
Accordingly, Google respectfully submits that, even if the Court maintains that the alleged personal 
information is Plaintiffs’ property, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ larceny claim insofar as the 
Complaint asserts theft by false pretense. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs allege that Google misappropriated the following categories of information:  “a. 
IP addresses linked to user agent; b. Session and Persistent cookie identifiers; c. X-client-data 
headers; and e. [sic] Browsing history and information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an 
Internet website.”  Compl. ¶ 45.  
Count Thirteen of Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts a claim for Statutory Larceny under 
California Penal Code §§ 484 and 496. Compl. ¶¶ 394-403. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that (1) 
“Section 484 [] defines ‘theft’ to include obtaining property by false pretense”; (2) Google “acted 
in a manner constituting theft and/or false pretense”; and (3) Google “stole, took, and/or fraudulently 
appropriated Plaintiffs’ PI without Plaintiffs’ consent.”  Id. ¶¶ 399-400. 
Count Fourteen of Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts a claim for violations of California’s UCL, 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. Plaintiffs allege they have “suffered an injury-in-fact, 
including the loss of money and/or property as a result of Google’s unfair, unlawful and/or deceptive 
practices, to wit, the unauthorized disclosure and taking of their personal information which has 
value as demonstrated by its use and sale by Google.”  Compl. ¶ 413. Plaintiffs further allege that 
they “have suffered harm in the form of diminution of the value of their private and personally 
identifiable data and content.”  Id.  
Google argued in its Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiffs’ larceny claim “fails at the outset 
because the Data that Google allegedly ‘stole’ is not ‘property.’”  Dkt. 57, at 22 (citing Low v. 
LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2012), for the proposition that “the weight 
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of authority holds that a plaintiff’s ‘personal information’ does not constitute property”). Google 
similarly argued that Plaintiffs’ UCL claim should be dismissed “because they fail to plausibly 
allege that Google caused them to lose ‘money or property.’”  Id. at 23-24 & n. 10 (collecting cases). 
Google further argued that Plaintiffs’ claim under § 496(a) for theft “by false pretense” 
should be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not allege the elements, which include a “consensual 
transfer of possession as well as title of property.”  Id. at 22 (quoting People v. Williams, 57 Cal. 
4th 776, 788 (2013)). 
Plaintiffs argued in opposition that they “have a property interest in their PI, not just a 
privacy interest.”  Dkt. 67, at 20. Plaintiffs further argued that “Low and earlier cases [holding that 
personal information is not property] no longer accurately reflect the current law.”  Id. at 22 n.15. 
Importantly, Plaintiffs did not dispute that their Complaint fails to allege theft by false pretense. 
In its reply, Google defended Low and the numerous other decisions from this District and 
elsewhere that have held that personal information is not property under California law. Dkt. 81, 
15-16. Specifically, Google argued that, under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kremen v. Cohen, 337 
F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003), and this Court’s decision in In re iPhone Application Litigation, 
844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Koh, J.), personal information is not property unless 
it is capable of “exclusive possession or control,” a description inapposite to  browsing history and 
other data at issue here. Dkt. 81, at 16. Google also asserted that “Plaintiffs do not dispute that they 
fail to allege the requisite elements of theft by false pretense, and that claim should therefore be 
dismissed.”  Dkt. 81, at 15.  
In the Order, the Court observed that “courts have recognized the ‘growing trend across 
courts ... to recognize the lost property value’ of personal information.”  Order at 36 (quoting In re 
Marriott Int’l, Inc. Cust. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 461 (D. Md. 2020), and 
citing In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 572 F. App’x 494, 494 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court further 
stated that “California courts have also acknowledged that users have a property interest in their 
personal information.”  Order at 36 (citing CTC Real Estate Servs. v. Lepe, 140 Cal. App. 4th 856, 
860 (2006), and In re Facebook Internet Tracking, 956 F.3d 589, 600 (9th Cir. 2020)). In rejecting 
Google’s argument that Plaintiffs failed to allege “lost money or property” for purposes of UCL 
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standing, the Court stated that “the Ninth Circuit and a number of district courts, including this 
Court, have concluded that plaintiffs who suffered loss of their personal information suffered 
economic injury and had standing.”  Order at 38 (citing, inter alia, In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 
572 F. App’s 494, 494 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
In denying Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ larceny and UCL claims, the Court did 
not address Google’s argument that, under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kremen, for an intangible 
property right to exist under California law, the property in question must be capable of “exclusive 
possession or control” by the party asserting ownership. Nor did the court address Google’s 
argument that Plaintiffs failed to allege theft by false pretenses. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A party may file a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order only with leave of 
Court. N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). “This Local Rule is designed to promote the just, speedy and 
inexpensive (or, at least, less expensive) determination of every action, as required by Rule 1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Network Appliance Inc. v. Sun Microsystems Inc., No. C-07-
06053, 2008 WL 4712604, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2008). A party seeking reconsideration must 
show either a material change in the facts or the law, or a “manifest failure by the Court to consider 
material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such 
interlocutory order.”  N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). A manifest failure to consider a dispositive legal 
issue may exist where a district court does not “squarely address” an issue presented. See Gonzales 
v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2018 WL 2047443, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018); see also Mauia v. Petrochem 
Insulation, Inc., 2018 WL 6092726, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2018) (granting reconsideration 
because “it appears that the Court manifestly failed to consider these two dispositive legal 
arguments” and dismissing); De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1107–08 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (granting leave to file reconsideration motion because, “having carefully reviewed the 
papers submitted, the Court agrees that this threshold [dispositive legal] question should have been 
addressed . . . .”); Sandoval v. Barneburg, 2013 WL 5961087, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) 
(concluding that “the denial of [the defendants’] motion to dismiss was based on a failure to consider 
[a] dispositive legal rule . . . .”). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ADDRESSING GOOGLE’S ARGUMENT THAT 
PLAINTIFFS’ PERSONAL INFORMATION IS NOT PROPERTY BECAUSE IT IS 
NOT CAPABLE OF EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OR CONTROL 
The Court did not consider—or at least squarely address—Google’s argument that the 
information Plaintiffs allege Google stole is not their “property” under California law because the 
information is not capable of “exclusive possession or control” by Plaintiffs. Had the Court 
considered this issue and ruled in Google’s favor, it would be dispositive of Plaintiffs’ larceny and 
UCL claims. See Cal. Penal Code § 496(a) (applies to “property that has been stolen”) (emphasis 
added); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (“Actions for relief pursuant to this chapter shall be 
prosecuted ... by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result 
of the unfair competition.”) (emphasis added). 
As Google argued in its papers, in Kremen, the Ninth Circuit held that whether an intangible 
property right exists turns on a three part test:  “First, there must be an interest capable of precise 
definition; second, it must be capable of exclusive possession and control; and third, the putative 
owner must have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.”  337 F.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). 
In iPhone, this Court correctly held that personal information similar to that which Plaintiffs allege 
Google stole—e.g., “Plaintiffs’ addresses and current whereabouts; the unique device identifier 
(‘UDID’) assigned to the iDevice; the user’s gender, age, zip code and time zone; and app-specific 
information such as which functions Plaintiff performed on the app,” 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1050—was 
not the plaintiffs’ property for purposes of their California state law conversion claim because they 
failed to establish “an interest capable of precise definition” and “it is difficult to see how this broad 
category of information is capable of exclusive possession or control.”2 Id. at 1074-75 (citing 
                                                 
2   Similarly, in iPhone, the Court originally dismissed the plaintiffs’ UCL claim “because 
Plaintiffs failed to allege that they lost money or property as a result of unfair competition.  
Specifically, the Court declined to recognize Plaintiffs’ personal information as a type of ‘currency’ 
or ‘a form of property,’ that was taken from Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants’ business practices.” 
Id. at 1072.  The Court ultimately allowed the UCL claim to proceed only after the plaintiffs “fleshed 
out their UCL claim to articulate a more traditional theory of a UCL violation”—namely, “the loss 
of money or property [] in the form of the allegedly overinflated cost of the iDevice itself as a result 
of the false statements regarding the geolocation features of the device.”  Id. Here, Plaintiffs do not 
contend that they paid anything to use the Chrome browser. 
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Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029); see also Cal Civ. Code § 654 (“The ownership of a thing is the right of 
one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which 
there may be ownership is called property.”) (emphasis added). 
The same is true here. Plaintiffs allege that “the following data qualifies as personal 
information when Google code instructs the Google Chrome browser to report it to Google:  a. IP 
addresses linked to user agent; b. Session and Persistent cookie identifiers; c. X-client-data headers; 
and e. [sic] Browsing history and information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an Internet 
website.”  Compl. ¶ 45. Plaintiffs do not allege that any of these categories of information is capable 
of exclusive possession or control, and clearly none of them is. “Browsing history and information 
regarding a consumer’s interaction with an Internet website” clearly is not capable of “exclusive 
possession or control” by the user. Indeed, the data reflecting this activity only exists because the 
websites collect it (either themselves, or through service providers). And, given the information 
reflects activity on their websites, they have at least as much of an interest in the data as users do. 
The three other categories of information that Plaintiffs allege Google misappropriated are 
not capable of “exclusive possession or control” either. Rather, they are created by other entities 
who assign the information to users for purposes of providing services or performing certain 
functions. For example, users cannot be said to “own” their IP address—it is assigned to them by 
their internet service provider, routinely exchanged every time a user accesses the internet or visits 
a website, and can be changed at any time depending on their location or other factors. Nor can users 
legitimately claim to “own” cookies that are placed on their browsers by websites or other entities, 
or the x-client-data header that Google assigns to certain instances of the Chrome browser so that 
Google can test new features in Chrome.  
In short, because none of the personal information that Plaintiffs allege Google 
misappropriated is capable of “exclusive possession or control” by users, it cannot constitute 
Plaintiffs’ property under California law. 
Google respectfully submits that none of the cases cited by Plaintiffs or the Court holds to 
the contrary. Rather, most of the cases address the entirely separate issue of whether alleged 
violations of privacy rights in personal information are sufficient to confer Article III standing. For 
































 -9- Case No. 5:20-cv-05146-LHK 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 
 
example, in support of its Order, the Court cited In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 572 F. App’x 494, 
494 (9th Cir. 2014). Order at 36. The Order states that, in Facebook Privacy Litigation, “the Ninth 
Circuit … concluded that plaintiffs who suffered a loss of their personal information suffered 
economic injury and had standing” to assert claims for breach of contract and fraud. Order at 38. 
Although Facebook Privacy Litigation involved similar allegations of misappropriation of personal 
information and harm, see 572 F. App’x at 494, the Ninth Circuit did not hold or suggest that 
personal information constitutes personal property under California law. To the contrary, in the very 
next paragraph after the one cited by the Court, the Ninth Circuit “affirm[ed] the district court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ UCL claim [based on the same alleged misappropriation of personal 
information] because plaintiffs failed to allege that they ‘lost money or property as a result of the 
unfair competition.’”  Id. (citing Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 4th 986 (2011) 
(emphasis added)). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Facebook Privacy Litigation is consistent with 
its decision in Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, in which the Court explained that the 
UCL’s standing requirement “is ‘more restrictive than federal injury in fact’ because it encompasses 
fewer kinds of injuries.”  847 F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kwikset Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 324 (2011) (“Whereas a federal plaintiff’s ‘injury in fact’ may be intangible 
and need not involve lost money or property, Proposition 64, in effect, added a requirement that a 
UCL plaintiff’s ‘injury in fact’ specifically involve ‘lost money or property,’” and finding the 
plaintiff lost money for purposes of UCL standing because he “purchased Kwikset’s locksets and 
would not have done so but for the ‘Made in U.S.A.’ labeling”)). 
Similarly, in In re Facebook Internet Tracking, 956 F.3d at 600 (cited by Order at 36), the 
Ninth Circuit held only that the alleged misappropriation of personal information was sufficient to 
confer Article III standing for purposes of plaintiffs’ claims for “trespass to chattels and fraud, 
statutory larceny, and violations of the CDAFA.”  See id. at 599.  The Ninth Circuit did not suggest 
that personal information constitutes the consumers’ property. Moreover, central to the Ninth 
Circuit’s finding that the plaintiffs had alleged an economic injury sufficient to confer Article III 
standing was its view that “California law recognizes a right to disgorgement of profits resulting 
from unjust enrichment, even where an individual has not suffered a corresponding loss.”  Id. 
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(emphasis added). “In other words, California law requires disgorgement of unjustly earned profits 
regardless of whether a defendant’s actions caused a plaintiff to directly expend his or her own 
financial resources or whether a defendant’s actions directly caused the plaintiff’s property to 
become less valuable.”  Id. at 600 (emphasis added). Thus, addressing the narrow issue before the 
Court—i.e., Article III standing—the Ninth Circuit held that Facebook’s alleged unjust enrichment 
from information about the plaintiffs’ was sufficient to confer Article III standing “regardless” of 
whether the plaintiffs had suffered a loss of money or property of their own. In short, the question 
of whether personal information is capable of “exclusive possession or control,” as required to 
constitute personal property for California’s larceny and UCL statutes, was not before the Ninth 
Circuit and therefore was not addressed. 
Nor does CTC v. Lepe, 140 Cal. App. 4th 856, 860-61 (2006) (cited by Order at 36) support 
a finding that the personal information alleged here is capable of exclusive possession or control. In 
Lepe, “an unknown perpetrator used the name, other personal information, and credit of claimant 
(defendant and appellant) Aurora Lepe to purchase real property.”  Id. at 858. “Without Ms. Lepe’s 
knowledge, title to the property was taken in her name, and her name was signed on a promissory 
note as the maker and on a deed of trust as a trustor.”  Id. (emphasis added). When the beneficiary 
under the deed of trust foreclosed and the real property was sold, “there were surplus funds, 
presumably because the real property value had increased.”  Id. The court held that “[u]nder the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, Ms. Lepe has an equitable interest [i.e., not a property interest] 
in the surplus funds from the foreclosure sale of the property—funds to which no one else has 
asserted a claim or interest,” and to which “[p]etitioner agreed that Ms. Lepe is equitably entitled to 
the surplus funds.”  Id. at 861 (emphasis added). An equitable interest in unjustly earned profits is 
materially distinct from a property interest in personal information. Moreover, although the court 
stated that “[a] person’s identifying information is a valuable asset, the misuse of which can have 
serious consequences to that person” in the context of identity theft, the question whether personal 
information constitutes personal property was not at issue, and the court certainly did not suggest 
that the kind of personal information at issue here is personal property under California law. 
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This Court also quoted the District Court for the District of Maryland as observing the 
“growing trend across courts … to recognize the lost property value in personal information.”  Order 
36 (citing In re Marriott Int’l, Inc. Cust. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 461 (D. Md. 
2020) (quotation marks omitted). But the court there held only that the disclosure of the plaintiffs’ 
personal information in a data breach “established [Article III] injury-in-fact based on the loss of 
value of their personal information.”  Id.; see also In re Anthem Inc. Data Breach Litig., 2016 WL 
3029783, at *14 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2016) (cited by Order at 36) (holding that economic and other 
harm flowing from disclosure of personal information in a data breach was sufficient to satisfy 
damages element for breach of contract claim); In re Yahoo! Inc. Cust. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
2017 WL 3727318, at *20-22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017) (cited by Order at 36) (similar, but 
concluding that plaintiffs that did not allege benefit of the bargain losses or out of pocket expenses 
failed to “allege ‘lost money or property’ under the UCL”). 
Finally, in Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged “that Facebook unlawfully 
misappropriated Plaintiffs’ names, photographs, likenesses, and identities for use in paid 
advertisements without obtaining Plaintiffs’ consent.”  830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(Koh, J.) (cited by Order at 36). The Court did not hold that the kind of personal information at issue 
here is capable of exclusive possession or control by users such that it may constitute the users’ 
property. To the contrary, the Court observed that many courts in this District have rejected the 
argument that personal information—including browsing history—constitutes property. Id. at 798 
(citing cases). The Court explained that such cases were distinguishable because, “[u]nlike the 
plaintiffs in [those cases], Plaintiffs here do not allege that their personal browsing histories have 
economic value to advertisers wishing to target advertisements at Plaintiffs themselves, nor that 
their demographic information has economic value for general marketing and analytics purposes. 
Rather, they allege that their individual, personalized endorsement of products, services, and brands 
to their friends and acquaintances has concrete, provable value in the economy at large, which can 
be measured by the additional profit Facebook earns from selling Sponsored Stories compared to its 
sale of regular advertisements.”  Id. 
































 -12- Case No. 5:20-cv-05146-LHK 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION 
 
In short, none of the cases cited by Plaintiffs or the Court holds that personal information is 
personal property under California law, nor do any of the cases suggest that personal information of 
the kind at issue here is capable of “exclusive possession and control” under Kremen. The only case 
cited by the parties or the Court that squarely addresses this issue—iPhone—correctly held that it is 
not. 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1072, 1075. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Facebook Privacy Litigation 
supports this Court’s conclusion in iPhone. Google thus respectfully requests that the Court 
reconsider that aspect of its Order holding that Plaintiffs’ alleged personal information is their 
property under California law. Should the Court agree with Google, the decision would be 
dispositive of Plaintiffs’ larceny and UCL claims and require dismissal of those claims. 
II. THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ADDRESSING GOOGLE’S ARGUMENT THAT 
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE THEFT BY FALSE PRETENSES 
Google argued in its Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiffs’ claim for theft by false pretense fails 
because the Complaint does not allege the elements, which include a “consensual transfer of 
possession as well as title of property.”  Dkt. 57, at 22 (citing People v. Williams, 57 Cal. 4th 776, 
788 (2013) (emphasis added)). As Google pointed out in its Reply, Plaintiffs’ Opposition did not 
respond to this argument, and therefore the theft-by-false pretense theory should have been 
dismissed. Dkt. 81, at 15. The Court’s Order does not address Google’s argument, or Plaintiffs’ 
failure to respond to it. 
To the extent the Court maintains that the information Google allegedly stole from Plaintiffs 
constitutes their personal property, the court should nevertheless reconsider its decision to allow 
Plaintiffs to proceed on a theft-by-false pretense theory because Plaintiffs do not and cannot dispute 
that the Complaint does not allege the elements. As the Court recognized, the premise of Plaintiffs’ 
case is that they did not consent to Google’s receipt of their alleged personal information. Order at 
35-36. Indeed, immediately following Plaintiffs’ allegation that Google “acted in a manner 
constituting … false pretense,” they allege that Google “fraudulently appropriated Plaintiffs’ PI 
without Plaintiffs’ consent.” Compl. ¶ 400. And Plaintiffs make no allegations whatsoever as to title. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ theft by false pretense claim should have been dismissed.  
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Google respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to file this 
motion for partial reconsideration, and order the parties to meet and confer on a reasonable schedule 
for an opposition, reply, and hearing date.  
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